

# QUO VADIS MODERN SALAFISM: RE-QUESTIONING SALAFI'S MODERATION VALUE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

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**Abstract:** This study examines the value of religious moderation in the Salafi movement on social media in Indonesia. The label of radical movement attached to the Salafi group has been considered a threat to the country's integrity. Their propaganda and schooling, especially on social media, contain some content that will cause social separation. The government mainstreams the campaign for religious moderation to counter radicalism. Hence, several organizations have been dissolved by the government because they are considered dangerous. However, the question is whether all groups linked to Salafi are hazardous and threaten the country's integrity. This article will solve this question using qualitative descriptive research. This research is equipped with a content analysis method. The results found three variants of the Salafi group spread in social media. The three variants are purist, haraki, and jihadist. The three variants have their style, even though purifying Islamic thought is the starting point of their agenda. By referring to the religious moderation indicators by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (nationalism, tolerance, non-violence, and accommodative to local culture), it can be concluded that: First, not all Salafi groups commit acts of violence; Second, not all Salafi groups are anti-nationalism; Third, several Salafi groups have moderate values in their *teachings even though they can* not be considered as moderate groups.

**Keywords:** Religious Moderation, Salafi, Social Media

## Introduction

It is undeniable that modernization, globalization, and Islamophobia are the main factors that construct the image of Islam in the global arena. The demonization of Islam and Muslims resulted from the assumption that Islam is closely related to violence, intolerance, anti-democracy, and anti-humanity.<sup>1</sup> Various attempts exist to stem the distortion of understanding of Islamic teachings. One of the ways to do this is to discuss the concept of religious moderation initiated by the Indonesian government.<sup>2</sup> Indonesia itself is a country that has diversity in terms of ethnicity, culture, social status, language, and religion. On the one hand, this diversity can become an integrating force that binds the community, but on the other hand, it can also be the cause of conflicts of various principles in society.<sup>3</sup>

In 2019, The Ministry of Religion issued a book explaining religious moderation.<sup>4</sup> There are three main points in the discussion, namely, a conceptual study of religious moderation, practical experience of religious moderation, and strategies for strengthening and implementing religious moderation.<sup>5</sup> The book indicates that the Ministry of Religion (Kemenag) is a pioneer in the discourse of religious moderation and is the beginning of the birth of religious moderation agents in Indonesia. In the year the book was published, the United Nations also set the International Year of Moderation.<sup>6</sup> Religious moderation itself, according to the Ministry of Religion, is "a point of view, attitude, and behavior that takes a middle position always acts pretty, and is not extreme in religion".<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Taufiq bin Radja Nurul Bahri, "Understanding Islamic Moderation: The Wasatiyya Imperative," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 4, no. 9 (2012): 18.

<sup>2</sup> Syaiful Arif, "Moderasi Beragama Dalam Diskursus Negara Islam: Pemikiran KH Abdurrahman Wahid," *Jurnal Bimas Islam* 13, no. 1 (2020): 74, <https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v13i1.189>.

<sup>3</sup> Agus Akhmadi, "Moderasi Beragama Dalam Keragaman Indonesia Religious Moderation in Indonesia's Diversity," *Jurnal Diklat Keagamaan* 13, no. 2 (2019): 45.

<sup>4</sup> Edi Junaedi, "Inilah Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Kemenag," *Harmoni* 18, no. 2 (2019): 2, <https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v18i2.414>.

<sup>5</sup> Tim Penyusun Kementerian Agama RI, *Moderasi Beragama, Badan Litbang Dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI* (Jakarta Pusta: Kementerian Agama RI, 2019).

<sup>6</sup> Junaedi, "Inilah Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Kemenag," 2.

<sup>7</sup> Tim Penyusun Kementerian Agama RI, *Moderasi Beragama*, 17.

Indonesia and Muslims are currently facing two main challenges, namely textualist tendencies in interpreting religious texts, which lead to misunderstandings and violent attitudes, and being too lax about religion and subject to errors in understanding religion.<sup>8</sup> The digital space has become a new ground for human interaction during this onslaught of disruptive technological developments. Not only social interactions but also religious interactions. No exception is the assumption that scapegoats the internet as one of the primary factors in the spread of radicalism.<sup>9</sup> This triggers the awareness of religious leaders to fortify Muslims from the influence of radicalism by venturing into the digital space. The mainstreaming of religious moderation in the digital space continues to develop to voice a moderate and tolerant religious narrative.<sup>10</sup>

The digital space has transformed into an arena of competition and contestation. In the book *When Religion Meets New Media* (2010), Heidi Campbell explains that the digital era impacts religious communities. The most noticeable is the erosion of community affiliation with religious institutions, shifting religious authority, strengthening individualism, and changing pluralists into Taliban. The religious authority that the Ulama originally owned, now anyone can take over depending on how he controls the digital space. Religious studies become easy to play with and then narrated according to subjective desires and interests.<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately, the movement of puritans and hard-line (radical) groups that carry emotional and aggressive religious narratives has received quite a large welcome and sympathy among some Muslims.<sup>12</sup> This puritan group, which is well known to the Salafi community, is considered a conservative and radical group. The world

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<sup>8</sup> Paelani Setia and Heri M. Imron, *Kampanye Moderasi Beragama: Dari Tradisional Menuju Digital, Laboratorium Penelitian Dan Pengembangan FARMAKA TROPIS Fakultas Farmasi Universitas Mulawarman, Samarinda, Kalimantan Timur*, 2016, 108.

<sup>9</sup> Setia and Imron, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Wildani Hefni, "Moderasi Beragama Dalam Ruang Digital: Studi Pengarusutamaan Moderasi Beragama Di Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam Negeri," *Jurnal Bimas Islam* 13, no. 1 (2020): 1, <https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v13i1.182>.

<sup>11</sup> Hefni, 3.

<sup>12</sup> Hefni, 4.

has known the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which brought Salafi thoughts and received opposition from various countries worldwide. Al-Qaeda was also well known as a group of jihadism ideology with the goal not only to mobilizing *umma* for the jihad against the West but also showing their superiority in knowledge therefore they have the power to change the reality.<sup>13</sup> A similar movement developing in Indonesia is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The group paid more attention to the internet, and it was proven instantly that they could master the digital space to spread their Salafi ideology.<sup>14</sup> This group was later disbanded by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights on July 19, 2017,<sup>15</sup> through Perppu Ormas Number 2 of 2017.<sup>16</sup> Nadzifah said that this group was prohibited from circulating because it was against local wisdom, state principles, and the tendency to mislead other Islamic groups so that they were vulnerable to cause division.<sup>17</sup>

From this explanation, we need to examine more intensely whether the Salafi groups who always echo the slogan of returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah and ordain themselves as carriers of the most authentic teachings of Islam have the value of religious moderation in their teachings. This claim is based on their recognition as a group that carries pure Islamic teachings with the assumption that the universal values of Islamic teachings indeed teach balance with the concept of fairness, which is closely related to moderatism. Several researchers, such as Paelani and Nadzifah, discussed the patterns of the Salafi group

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<sup>13</sup> Roel Meijer, "Yusuf Al-Uyairi and the Making of A Revolutionary Salafi Praxis," *Die Welt Des Islams* 47, no. 3 (2007): 422.

<sup>14</sup> Paelani Setia, "Membumikan Khilafah Di Indonesia: Strategi Mobilisasi Opini Publik Oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Di Media Sosial," *Journal of Society and Development* 1, no. 2 (2021): 34.

<sup>15</sup> Yan Yusuf, "Selain FPI, Inilah 4 Ormas Yang Dibubarkan Pemerintah," *Sindonews.Com*, accessed July 14, 2022, <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/285142/12/selain-fpi-inilah-4-ormas-yang-dibubarkan-pemerintah-1609315958#:~:text=Melalui Dirjen Administrasi Hukum Umum, AH.01.08 tahun 2017 keluar.>

<sup>16</sup> Setia, "Membumikan Khilafah Di Indonesia: Strategi Mobilisasi Opini Publik Oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Di Media Sosial," 33.

<sup>17</sup> Siti Nailatun Nadzifah, "Pandangan GP Anshor Terhadap Salafi Wahabi," 2018, 77.

movement,<sup>18</sup> while other researchers, such as Setia and Triyono discussed the Salafi group movement on social media,<sup>19</sup> and also Hasbi and Akhamdi examined the concept and implementation of religious moderation in various levels of society.<sup>20</sup> This study aims to examine the value of religious moderation of the Salafi group, which is considered radical in the digital space, especially on social media. Using qualitative descriptive research methods, this research is equipped with content analysis on media texts.<sup>21</sup> The types of data used are written and oral statements and expressions, while the data sources are taken from religious narrative documents in various groups of Salafi social media. The data collection method in this study uses library research.

## **Result and Discussion**

### **The Urgency of Religious Moderation Movement**

The incoming transnational Islamic movement is considered a threat by some parties. Several groups, such as Wahhabis, Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir, and ISIS are regarded as carriers of radicalism that can disrupt the country's integrity. Various ways were taken to infuse his extremist understanding into multiple elements of society, starting from the mosque's foyer, community organizations, and campuses. The internet is one of the most accessible media for spreading extremist ideas to get a stage in.<sup>22</sup> With social media, the group can capture various elements of society at once. People's dependence on social media makes the digital space more powerful in

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<sup>18</sup> Setia, "Membumikan Khilafah Di Indonesia: Strategi Mobilisasi Opini Publik Oleh Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Di Media Sosial."

<sup>19</sup> Agus Triyono and Nifsya Khaira Marhuda, "Studi Analisis Isi Pesan Dakwah Dalam Media Sosial Instagram @dakwah\_tauhid," *Jurnal Interaksi: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi* 4, no. 1 (2020): 50–67, <https://doi.org/10.30596/interaksi.v4i1.3944>.

<sup>20</sup> Muhammad Hasbi, "Dita Milenial Dalam Moderasi Peningkatan Pelayanan Penghulu (Studi Kasus Di KUA Parindu)," *Jurnal Bimas Islam* 12, no. 2 (2019): 233–62, <https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v12i2.117>.

<sup>21</sup> Moch Fakhruroji, Ridwan Rustandi, and Busro, "Bahasa Agama Di Media Sosial : Analisis Framing Pada Media Sosial ' Islam Populer ' Religious Languages on Social Media Framing Analysis on Social Media ' Islam Populer,'" *Jurnal Bimas Islam* 13, no. 2 (2020): 208.

<sup>22</sup> M. Nanda Fanindy and Siti Mupida, "Pergeseran Literasi Pada Generasi Milenial Akibat Penyebaran Radikalisme di Media Sosial," *Millah* 20, no. 2 (2021): 197.

constructing a public understanding of a circulating issue. Research from WeAreSocial shows that social media users globally reached 3.8 billion people in January 2020, while in Indonesia, it reached 160 million active social media users.<sup>23</sup>

Some researchers call religious content presented in the digital space through social media the phenomenon of *tecno-religion*, *cyber-da'wah*, and so on.<sup>24</sup> Social media is more loved because it can provide much more instant religious information than print media such as books, journals, and the *turats*. Extremist groups responded well to the increase in the middle-class Muslim community's piety to present various religious products and fatwas. This is what then leads to public opinion on religion.<sup>25</sup> Freedom in choosing religious content in society becomes an open contestation stage to convey information, propaganda, and religious ideas (self-presentation).<sup>26</sup>

With the rise of extremist understanding circulating on the internet, it is necessary to digitize Islamic moderates by bringing various moderation discourses into the digital space through social media to prevent radicalism in society.<sup>27</sup> Religious moderation is very significant in winning over radicalism for various reasons. First, make people aware of human nature to do good in heterogeneity and coexist. Second, moderatism can provide compassion, hospitality, elevating human dignity, and a life based on morals, religion, and universal values. Third, to raise awareness to be a good citizen of the country and the world. Fourth, a moderate, fair, and balanced attitude is the key to establishing diversity. Fifth, moderatism can manage a pluralistic and

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<sup>23</sup> Fakhruroji, Rustandi, and Busro, "Bahasa Agama Di Media Sosial: Analisis Framing Pada Media Sosial 'Islam Populer' Religious Languages on Social Media Framing Analysis on Social Media 'Islam Populer,'" 206.

<sup>24</sup> Fakhruroji, Rustandi, and Busro, 207.

<sup>25</sup> Fanindy and Mupida, "Pergeseran Literasi Pada Generasi Milenial Akibat Penyebaran Radikalisme di Media Sosial," 10.

<sup>26</sup> Fakhruroji, Rustandi, and Busro, "Bahasa Agama Di Media Sosial: Analisis Framing Pada Media Sosial 'Islam Populer' Religious Languages on Social Media Framing Analysis on Social Media 'Islam Populer,'" 207.

<sup>27</sup> Arifinsyah Arifinsyah, Safria Andy, and Agusman Damanik, "The Urgency of Religious Moderation in Preventing Radicalism in Indonesia," *ESENSIA: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin* 21, no. 1 (2020): 91, <https://doi.org/10.14421/esensia.v21i1.2199>.

multicultural society amidst disruptive technological developments. Sixth, religious moderation is essential not only to create harmonious external relations between religions but also in the internal relations of various sects within a religion.<sup>28</sup>

### **Definition and Principles of Religious Moderation**

Quraish Shihab defines religious moderation as "a moderate religious attitude that is impartial to the left and the right." Meanwhile, Hamka said that moderation means being in the middle, not only fixating on the world aspect and not only on the spiritual aspect, but he said that religious moderation is a "balanced position between the two" as well. Then Hasbi Ash-Shiddiqieqy defines religious moderation as "a balanced attitude, not living excessively in religion and not including people who are too lacking in carrying out religious obligations." The interpreter agrees that religious moderation is balanced not only on the natural-material aspect but also on the supernatural-immaterial.<sup>29</sup>

Furthermore, there are seven dimensions of religious moderation formulated from the thoughts of Quraish Shihab, Hamka, and Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy. First, moderation in theology or the middle in view of God. Second, moderation in worship or balance in mental and physical movements. Third, restraint in law or objectively upholding justice. Fourth, moderation in mu'amalah or fairness when interacting in the context of transactions and human relations. Fifth, moderation in creating humans and the universe or the balance between this world and the hereafter. Sixth, moderation in government or balancing the functions contained in the government structure. Seventh, moderation in culinary or consuming something with neither excess nor deficiency.<sup>30</sup>

To be able to call a person or a group a moderate group, indicators are needed. Mustaqim Hasan, in his research, formulates that

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<sup>28</sup> Arifinsyah, Andy, and Damanik, 91.

<sup>29</sup> Muhammad Ulinnuha and Mamluatun Nafisah, "Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy, Hamka, Dan Quraish Shihab," *Subuf* 13, no. 1 (2020): 68, <https://doi.org/10.22548/shf.v13i1.519>.

<sup>30</sup> Ulinnuha and Nafisah, 69–74.

indicators of religious moderation according to Islam can be measured by ten principles. These principles are *wasathiyah* (taking the middle way), *tawazun* (balanced), *i'tidal* (straight and firm), *tasamuh* (tolerance), *musawah* (equality), *syuro* (deliberation), *ishlah* (reform), *awlawiyyah* (priority first), *tathammur wa ibtikar* (dynamic and innovative), and *tahadhdhur* (civilized).<sup>31</sup> In addition, Donny et al. also formulated indicators of religious moderation but from the perspective of Pancasila. There are at least five indicators of religious moderation according to the number of points in Pancasila. The five indicators are the attitude of respect and respecting various aspects of diversity in religious diversity, upholding the importance of the benefit of humanity, upholding the value of unity and integrity, being democratic, and upholding the importance of justice in addressing diversity in local wisdom.<sup>32</sup>

More narrowly, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) No. 2 of 2017 concerning Community Organizations (Ormas) states that to become an Ormas accepted by the state, they must meet several requirements or indicators formulated by the Perppu. From Article 59 of Peppu No. 2 of 2017, it can be formulated that the various moderation indicators for community organizations are: First, not to commit acts of hostility towards ethnicity, religion, race, or class; Second, not to abuse, blaspheme or desecrate the religion professed in Indonesia. Third, not to commit acts of violence, disturb the peace and public order, or damage public facilities and social facilities; Fourth, not carry out activities that are the duties and authorities of law enforcement by the provisions of the legislation; Fifth, do not use the name, symbol, flag, or symbol of an organization that has similarities in principle or its entirety to the name, symbol, flag or symbol of a separatist movement organization or prohibited organization; Sixth, not to carry out separatist activities that threaten the sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia;

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<sup>31</sup> Mustaqim Hasan, "Prinsip Moderasi Beragama Dalam Kehidupan Berbangsa," *Jurnal Mubtadiin* 7, no. 2 (2021): 115–21.

<sup>32</sup> Donny Khoirul Azis et al., "Pancasila Educational Values in Indicators Religious Moderation in Indonesia," *FTTRAH: Jurnal Kajian Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 7, no. 2 (2021): 230, <https://doi.org/10.24952/fitrah.v7i2.4475>.



Seventh, do not adhere to, develop, and spread teachings or understandings that are contrary to Pancasila.<sup>33</sup>

As a pioneer, the Ministry of Religious Affairs provides basic principles in various moderation, namely fairness and balance. Fair means impartial and impartial, while balanced means balance in perspective, attitude, and commitment to always side with equality, humanity, and justice. Balance is firm but not harsh and always on the side of justice but not to the point of usurping the rights of others.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, in the book “Moderation of Religion,” the Ministry of Religion formulates various moderation indicators into four things: nationalism, tolerance, non-violence, and accommodative to local culture. With these four indicators, it can be recognized how strong the religious moderation of a person or a community group is and how much vulnerability they have. In the next sub-chapter, these four indicators will be further explored and used as an analytical tool to examine religious moderation values in Salafi groups in Indonesia.<sup>35</sup>

### **The Development of the Salafi Movement in Indonesia**

Salafi has the meaning of predecessor, ancestor, and salaf madhhab. In the encyclopedia of the modern Islamic world, the Salaf generation is three generations at the beginning of the emergence of Islam, namely at the time of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, the *tabi'in* generation (followers of the Prophet Muhammad and the Prophet's companions), and the *tabi'it tabi'in* generation (Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is considered the most recent generation of salaf).<sup>36</sup> Salafi movement started around the year four Hijri, namely when the scholars of the madhhab Imam Ahmad bin Hambal were starting to develop, this was done because of the emergence of new ideas such as the Mu'tazilah and then passed on by

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<sup>33</sup> “Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 2 Tahun 2017 Tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan,” Pub. L. No. 2 (2017).

<sup>34</sup> Tim Penyusun Kementerian Agama RI, *Moderasi Beragama*, 19.

<sup>35</sup> Tim Penyusun Kementerian Agama RI, 43.

<sup>36</sup> Suhilman, “Sejarah Perkembangan Pemikiran Gerakan Salafiyah,” *Jurnal Islamika: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 19 (July 2019): 70–80.

Ibn Taimiyah.<sup>37</sup> He said that the salaf has its own method, namely using the primary sources of the Qur'an and Hadith and rejecting reason because reason can lead to error.<sup>38</sup>

Salafis are not a group of religious organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, but a method that follows the salaf methods, which purifies Islamic teachings by trying to imitate the previous generation whose substance of religious teachings directly uses the Qur'an and Sunnah and rejects new teachings that smell of heresy, superstition, and *keburafat*. The history of the emergence of Salafi in Indonesia cannot be separated from the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia), led by Muhammad Natsir in 1967. The purpose of this group was to establish politics through *da'wah*.<sup>39</sup> This thought developed rapidly in Indonesia in the 1980s. This movement was brought by Indonesian students who have completed their studies in the Middle East, especially alumnus from the Islamic University of Medina. They got the thoughts of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab with the style of his Salafi method. In addition, developments at that time were also very rapid due to adequate funds and finance from donors in the Middle East.<sup>40</sup>

Din Wahid classifies the Salafi movement in Indonesia into three variants: First, purist or puritanical; Second, *haraki*; and Third, *jibadi*.<sup>41</sup> The three groups have the same thoughts regarding monotheism, rejecting heresy, and *al wala' wa al-barra'*. The Salafi movement in the first category is a Salafi movement that is only engaged in scientific development. This category is a Salafi movement that campaigns for an invitation to go back to the Qur'an and Sunnah and stay away from sinful matters according to the understanding of the group. The group also claims to be the most righteous and

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<sup>37</sup> W Hafid, "Menyoal Gerakan Salafi di Indonesia (Pro-Kontra Metode Dakwah Salafi)," *Al-Tafaqqub: Journal of Islamic Law* 2 (2020): 29–48.

<sup>38</sup> Suhilman, "Sejarah Perkembangan Pemikiran Gerakan Salafiyah."

<sup>39</sup> Abdul Jamil Wahab, "Reading New Phenomenons Salafi Movements On Solo," *Puslitbang Bimas Agama Dan Layanan Keagamaan Badan Litbang Dan Diklat Kementerian Agama*, 42, no. 2 (2019): 1–16.

<sup>40</sup> Hafid, "Menyoal Gerakan Salafi di Indonesia (Pro-Kontra Metode Dakwah Salafi)."

<sup>41</sup> Wahab, "Reading New Phenomenons Salafi Movements On Solo."

disbelieves in those who disagree. The attitude of this group towards the government is different; some refuse to join the organization, but some are open to other groups. The second category of Salafi movements is the *haraki* group. This group supports the purification of Islamic teachings but disagrees with a state system that is not based on Islamic law. This group is limited to disagreeing with the state system and not attacking and revolting.

Then the third category of the Salafi movement is jihadi. This group also supports the purification of Islamic teachings but does not agree with a state system that does not apply Islamic law and attacks other groups who do not agree, even committing murder and rebellion. Meijer reveals that since the 1980s, there have been three types of justification for violence according to this jihadi movement. First, the practice of violence based on the call of non-direct opposition to the government by intimidating opponents, breaking up festivals, and burning video shops. This type is influenced by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The second is claiming the permanent revolution of jihad and jihadism. The third is national resistance to foreign occupation by jihad movement.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Roel Meijer, *Towards a Political Islam* (Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations' Clingendael, 2009), 14.

Salafi Categories	Similarities	Differences
Purist	These three categories of Salafi have the same teachings, namely, purifying the teachings of Islam by eliminating the smell of heresy. This group also often disbelieves other groups who disagree. <sup>43</sup>	The outlook of this group towards the government is different; some refuse to join the organization, and some are open to other groups.
Haraki		This group promotes the purification of faith, worship, and politics and disagrees with the state system other than Islam but does not attack and rebel.
Jihadi		This group carries out the purification of faith and worship as well as politics and attacks other groups who disagree, even to the point of committing murder and rebellion against the legitimate government.

Table 1: The similarities and differences of Salafi categories in Indonesia

From these three Salafi variants, it can be identified several groups of organizations belonging to the three forms of Salafi above in the context of the Indonesian state, including:

a. *Wahabi-Purist Salafi*

Wahabi is a Salafi group that is included in the Puritan Salafi category. This group is influential in upholding the principles of their error in faith and worship. They want to avoid mixing new things to worship so that everything that was never done by the Prophet Muhammad is considered a heresy that must be avoided. Traditionalists and modernists have different perspectives on

<sup>43</sup> Ayu Juniarti and H Abubakar, “Menelisik Isu Wahabi Di Muhammadiyah Tahun 2012 - 2018,” *Syams : Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 2, no. 1 (2021).

religion. Among these differences is their perspective on the teachings or religion of the Muslim community in Indonesia, the concept of Islamic teachings, or their perspective on the text of the Qur'an, Hadith, and classical Islamic treasures, which will affect the selection of the method of setting rules in various kinds of fatwas as a religious guide. Modernist Muslims, for example, hold the view that Islam is the correct teaching, so the Qur'an and Sunnah, which are used as basic guidelines, have answered all the problems of the rules that exist in the world.<sup>44</sup>

In addition, these Salafi-Wahabi groups do not play a role in politics. However, when faced with religious issues, they behave to the extreme by disbelieving other groups who disagree. Their goal is only to preach to purify the teachings of Islam according to their understanding.

b. *Ikhwanul Muslimin-Haraki Salafi*

This type of Salafi follows the Salafi faith of Saudi Arabia, but his political movement follows the Muslim Brotherhood. This Salafi can also be called a Salafi with a political vision.<sup>45</sup> These political movements are sometimes practical politics, and some are in the social sphere.

In Indonesia, the practical political movement carried out by this type of group can be called PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera).<sup>46</sup> This Salafi movement is oriented in the realm of practical politics. This type of Salafi strongly condemns the existence of radicalism in achieving a goal. Based on the characteristics of the three Salafi categories in Indonesia, it can be ascertained that this type of Salafi category is included in the haraki category.

c. *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) dan Jamaah Ansbarut Taubid (JAT)-Jihadi Salafi*

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<sup>44</sup> Endang Madali, "Pandangan Hukum Islam Terhadap Intoleransi Salafi Wahabi," *Nurani Hukum* 3, no. 2 (2020): 30, <https://doi.org/10.51825/nhk.v3i2.9107>.

<sup>45</sup> Ahmad Sanusi, "Konsep Negara Menurut Ikhwanul Muslimin," *Al-Abkam* 14, no. 2 (2018): 1, <https://doi.org/10.37035/ajh.v14i2.1426>.

<sup>46</sup> Syafuddin Fadlillah, "Karya Ilmiah Partai Politik Islam Di Indonesia Dan Jaringan Ideologi Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik Universitas Al-Azhar Indonesia," *Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Politik Universitas Al-Azhar Indonesia*, 2018.

These two groups are well-known organizations in Indonesia in the jihadist movement, especially in the Solo area.<sup>47</sup> Both groups are open to radically enforcing Islam's purification through terror and rebellion. JAT's ideology is to reject all forms of human-made ideology. This group was founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In addition, JI members were also spearheaded by Abdullah Sungkar. This group's movement is to radically fight for establishing Islamic law in Indonesia. From the ideology and characteristics of Jemaah Islamiyyah and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, it can be categorized that these two groups are categories of the type of Salafi jihadis that developed in Indonesia. Maher's study reveals five elements of the Salafi Jihadi movement: *jihad*, *takfir*, *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, *tawhīd*, and *hākimiyya*.<sup>48</sup>

### **The Value of Religious Moderation in the Salafi Movement on Social Media**

Some points concluded from the subject discussed in the article. The Salafi movement has a general impression in the ears of the Indonesian people. Radical framing against Salafi groups is a never-ending issue. The Salafi group is considered not to have the value of religious moderation because some Salafi groups want to replace the Indonesian state system with the Islamic caliphate system. The author's analysis of the Salafi reveals that the Salafi consists of three categories, namely: first, Purists such as the Wahabi group; second, Haraki such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin, which in the Indonesian context is affiliated with the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and; third, Jihadi such as the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) group.

From these three categories, it can be seen that not all Salafis are radical. Some Salafis are vital in spreading their Salafi da'wah and want to avoid knowing about political affairs or carrying out rebellions. With the division of Salafi categories above, the author needs to know the value of religious moderation in the non-radical Salafi movement.

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<sup>47</sup> Wahab, "Reading New Phenomenons Salafi Movements On Solo."

<sup>48</sup> Roel Meijer, "Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea By Shiraz Maher," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 29, no. 2 (2018): 283.

This can be known through their social media to be analyzed by the author. The following is the list of social media as the object of this article:

<b>Salafi Categories</b>	<b>Social Media</b>	<b>Note</b>
Purist	Yufid TV Rodja TV	<a href="https://youtube.com/c/yufid">https://youtube.com/c/yufid</a> (Youtube) <a href="https://youtube.com/c/MenebarCahayaSunnah">https://youtube.com/c/MenebarCahayaSunnah</a> (Youtube)
Haraki	Khilafah Channel Reborn	<a href="https://youtu.be/xvuAAM9Mq14">https://youtu.be/xvuAAM9Mq14</a> (Youtube) dan <a href="https://instagram.com/khilafahchannel?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y">https://instagram.com/khilafahchannel?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y</a> (Instagram)
Jihadi	JAD Mujahidin	<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543426008241516544">https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543426008241516544</a> (Twitter)

*Tabel 2: The Social Media of Salafi Group*

From the data above, discussing the value of existing moderation among the three groups is necessary. Therefore, here, the author classifies them into three categories of Salafi:

*a. The Moderation Value of Purist Salafi*

It can be seen that the Salafi Purists are dominated by Wahabi preachers, with YouTube channels that are popular among the public, namely Yufid TV and Rodja TV. It can be seen from all the videos on Yufid TV, all of which are directed to the issue of worship, interpretation of the Qur'an, hadith, the book of the Salaf, and morals. Meanwhile, on the Rodja TV YouTube channel, the da'wah videos point to the issue of worship, the Qur'an, hadith, salaf book, and tarbiyah. These two channels are da'wah content to invite Muslims to purify Islamic teachings under their principles and beliefs. From these contents, it is infrequent and almost non-existent to talk about the establishing of the caliphate in Indonesia. Even in some pulpits, the preachers put a small red and white flag on the preacher's table.

The moderation value will be analyzed based on the indicators of religious moderation published by the government, such as nationalism, tolerance, anti-violence, and accommodative to local culture.<sup>49</sup> In the category of the Purist Salafi movement, it can be analyzed that in the first indicator, there is a sense of commitment to the state. One of the visible pieces of evidence is that on one of the lecturers' podiums, the Purists put a small red and white flag on the preacher's table to convey their da'wah. This can be seen in the study of Ustadz Mubarak Bamualim on the Rodja TV channel. In the second indicator of tolerance, this Purist group does not tolerate religious beliefs that are not in accordance with them, and it is even easy to convert and disbelieve practices that are different from the group's understanding. In the third indicator of anti-violence, this purist group is very anti-violence and anti-radicalism. This is like a study conducted by Dr. Ali Musri on Rodja TV. In the fourth indicator, this Puritan group has an unfavourable response to local culture. According to him, Islamic law and culture should be separated and not mixed up.

From the accumulation of the analysis of democratic values carried out by the author on the purist Salafi, it can be simplified by reading the following table:

<b>Moderation Value Indicators</b>	<b>Achievement</b>	<b>Note</b>
Nationalism	V	<a href="https://youtu.be/8Bp_q-nQdxc">https://youtu.be/8Bp_q-nQdxc</a>
Tolerance	-	<a href="https://youtu.be/rNUteP7wGaY">https://youtu.be/rNUteP7wGaY</a>
Anti-violence	V	<a href="https://youtu.be/hiPkVxPxbWM">https://youtu.be/hiPkVxPxbWM</a>
Accomodative to local culture	-	<a href="https://youtu.be/V4eoc5w8NuE">https://youtu.be/V4eoc5w8NuE</a>

*Table 3: The Achievement of Moderation Value by Purist Salafi*

<sup>49</sup> Tim Penyusun Kementerian Agama RI, *Moderasi Beragama*.



From the analysis above, it can be concluded that the Purist Salafi has two moderating values: nationalism and anti-violence. Meanwhile, tolerance and accommodativeness in local culture are not found in the Purist Salafi group.

b. *The Moderation Value of Haraki Salafi*

The Khalifah Channel Reborn account is an account category that operates in the Haraki Salafi category. The social media account has a YouTube account and an Instagram account. The Instagram account is used to share the schedule of studies and themes that will be carried out so that media connoisseurs know the themes that will be studied at a particular time. Meanwhile, the YouTube channel from the account is used as a propaganda medium to convey in-depth the themes presented by the presenters. The percentage of studies conducted on the channel is as follows:




Figure 1: *The Percentage of Channel Content*

From the data above, it can be seen that studies on the caliphate and the strengthening of Islamic law are often presented to uphold the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. However, this group is only a thought and does not rebel or kill disagreeable people. In studies that smell of the caliphate, the lecturers here explain in detail, starting from understanding the caliphate, the importance of the caliphate, and the caliphate government system and

rejecting the government system made by humans. Even though they disagree with the government system, they have not issued weapons to change the order of the government system. As well as the value of moderation declared by the government, this category of Salafi who has the Muslim Brotherhood movement when viewed from the indicator of the value of moderation, the data obtained are as follows:

In the first indicator of nationalism, Haraki Salafi strongly disagrees with the state system other than the caliphate system. This is because they assume that the state system other than the caliphate is manufactured, while the caliphate system is directly from Allah. To the study presented by Dr. Rian, the caliphate is not an ideology, but the caliphate is a state system. In addition, it obliges Islamic countries to implement an Islamic caliphate. In the second indicator of the value of tolerance, this type of Salafi group is the same as the Puritan Salafi, who strongly disagree with groups that do not follow their teachings. In the third indicator of the value of anti-violence, this Salafi group refuses to commit violence. This can be seen from the studies on their YouTube channel, which require obedience to Allah, the Prophet and the Ruler who believes. In the fourth indicator of accommodativeness to local culture, this category of Salafi has similarities with puritanical Salafi, which is more inclined to imitate ancient Muslims and wants to civilize all life by following the Qur'an and sunnah, be it the style of dress or appearance and other. This group also considers all liberals who disagree with the teachings of this group.

From the accumulation of the analysis of democratic values by the author of Haraki Salafi, it can be simplified by reading the following table:

<b>Moderation Value Indicators</b>	<b>Achievement</b>	<b>Note</b>
Nationalism	-	<a href="https://youtu.be/d7sHK0DCFeE">https://youtu.be/d7sHK0DCFeE</a>
Tolerance	-	<a href="https://youtu.be/S3hqNG2qCIc">https://youtu.be/S3hqNG2qCIc</a>
Anti-violence	V	<a href="https://youtu.be/rL3FHd_tgmw">https://youtu.be/rL3FHd_tgmw</a>
Accommodative to local culture	-	<a href="https://youtu.be/mBMf3u77lcY">https://youtu.be/mBMf3u77lcY</a>

*Tabel 4: The Achievement of Moderation Value by Haraki Salafi*

From the analysis above, it can be seen that this type of Haraki Salafi has a moderate value in only one aspect, namely the anti-violence indicator. The other three aspects, national commitment, tolerance, and accommodative to local culture, do not exist in this type of Salafi group.

*c. The Moderation Value of Jihadi Salafi*

The social media accounts indicated Salafi jihadi, in this case, was named as Jad Mujahidin. The Twitter account is an account from Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD). The group was formed in 2015 and is controlled by 21 terror organizations declared to be ISIS. The posts uploaded on Twitter show that in addition to really wanting an Islamic caliphate government system, it is also provocative in providing resistance to the legitimate government.

Judging from the moderating value indicator set by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, it can be seen that this jihadist Salafi group in national commitment strongly disagrees because this group wants to establish an Islamic caliphate according to Islamic teachings. In the second indicator, tolerance, this group is the same as the two Salafi categories above. This group is anti-tolerance if it does not agree with the group, both tolerance in diversity, politics, and others. In the third indicator, this group is very radical with the spread of the caliphate preaching, hijrah, and jihad. Because this group is affiliated with the ISIS terrorist

organization, the direction of its movement is, of course, the same as that of the group. The fourth indicator of accommodative to local culture is the same as other Salafis. Because the core of Salafi teachings is to purify Islamic teachings, this jihadist Salafi group is more concerned with jihad and forming an Islamic caliphate state.

The following is a table of conclusions from the Salafi jihadis to make it easier for readers:

<b>Moderation Value Indicators</b>	<b>Achievement</b>	<b>Note</b>
Nationalism	-	<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1547566818071420933">https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1547566818071420933</a>
Tolerance	-	<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543426008241516544">https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543426008241516544</a>
Anti-violence	-	<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543620950381367296">https://mobile.twitter.com/JadyMujahidin/status/1543620950381367296</a>
Accomodative to local culture	-	

*Tabel 5: The Achievement of Moderation Value by Jihadi Salafi*

The conclusion is that this group possesses no moderation value because there are no achieved indicator. From the three Salafi characteristics above, it can be concluded that the Purists and Haraki Salafi still have moderate religious values, with details that they have moderate values in the anti-violence indicator. However, Haraki Salafi does not have moderate values in national commitment. In comparison, the Jihadi Salafi has no moderation value in religion.

The following are the details of the moderating value of the three types of Salafi categories:

Salafi Categories	Religious Moderation Values Note			
	Nationalism	Tolerance	Anti-violence	Accommodative to Local Culture
Purists	V	-	V	-
Haraki	-	-	V	-
Jihadi	-	-	-	-

*Tabel 6: The Conclusion of Moderation Value by Salafi Group*

This table shows some religious moderation values achieved by the Salafi group on social media by referring to the indicators formulated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. First, the purist Salafi movement on social media, represented by Yufid TV and Rodja TV, reveals that they have nationalism and anti-violence values in their social media campaign. Nevertheless, they can not accommodate the tolerance and local culture of their campaign. Second, haraki Salafi, represented by Khilafah Channel Reborn, is still on their way to avoiding violence, even though they no longer have nationalism, tolerance, and accommodative to local culture values. Last, the table said that jihadi Salafi is a complete non-moderate group. As a representation of this group, JAD Mujahidin has no moderation values in their campaign, especially on social media, neither nationalism, tolerance, anti-violence, nor accommodative to local culture.

**Conclusion**

Some points concluded from the subject discussed in the article. The Salafi group movement has spread to the digital space through social media, which is very loved by various levels of society. The propaganda of radicalism brought by the Salafi group raises concerns because it has the potential to cause division and the collapse of the state. However, it is necessary to re-examine whether all these Salafi groups can threaten the country's integrity with the propaganda and understanding they bring. In this study, it was found that the movement of the Salafi group was divided into three variants. The three variants are Purists, Haraki, and Jihadi.

Purist Salafi is a Salafi group that separates religion and politics and only focuses on religious studies. In other words, this group is not affiliated with politics to establish the Islamic Khilafah. The Haraki Salafi uses political media to spread their propaganda and aims to uphold the Islamic Khilafah without resorting to violence. The last group, the Jihadi Salafi, uses violence to establish the Islamic Khilafah. These three groups have similarities in puritanism, namely the purification of Islamic teachings by using the slogan of returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah.

By using the indicators of religious moderation issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it can be concluded that the Purist Salafi achieved two of the four indicators of religious moderation, namely nationalism and anti-violence. At the same time, the Haraki Salafi only achieved one indicator of religious moderation, namely anti-violence. The Jihadi Salafi does not meet any of the four indicators of religious moderation. So, it can be understood that not all Salafi groups can harm the country. There is even one Salafi group that has national insight. In other words, although it cannot be said to be a moderate group because it does not meet the four indicators of religious moderation, there is still a value of moderation in some Salafi groups, which have always been said to be radical groups as a whole. It is recommended to the other researchers to discuss deeply how can Salafi group turn into a moderate movement totally.

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